In examining each of these battles, Mr. DeVries has examined every known chronicle and has supported his research with an outstanding set of notes—the footnotes themselves are an extremely valuable research tool for anyone interested in these battles. Beyond the footnotes his text efficiently places the battle in context and traces the events preceding it to set the stage. In the battle narrative he explores the tactics and results employed that result in a remarkable pattern that forms his thesis—time after time, disciplined infantry set on a defensible footing, usually on ground of their own choosing, defeated the prideful, more numerous and favored cavalry forces that had been the mainstay of medieval armies since the days of Charlemagne.

Following the thread of battles provided, Mr. DeVries thesis is certainly well supported. Starting with Courtrai (1302) and ending with Neville’s Cross (1346), the infantry does appear to have dominated in each case. Seventeen battles is enough to be seductive, and I found myself constantly impressed with the quality of research that had been put into the work.

Traditional military history of  warfare in the Middle Ages continued to hold the medieval idea that cavalry dominated the battlefield until the introduction of gunpowder. More recent scholarship—especially in Britain—has tended to advance a technological / tactical explanation, attributing English successes during the Hundred Years War as being due to the power of the longbow and the English skill in its tactical deployment. Mr. DeVries argues that neither of these views is accurate, that it was infantry rather than archers that caused such incredible victories where so few stood against so many.

Reading his work I found myself wondering not so much at what was presented but what was absent; these seventeen battles were undoubtedly chosen because they clearly illuminate his observations. I wondered how he would argue for the other set-piece battles of the period (the book is scrupulously honest in that it treats battles where both sides were drawn up ready for fighting, not including ambushes where one side was caught unawares), which so richly populate the era. I found in this wonder a pleasant challenge, for I was intrigued enough to start looking with more care at other battles.

The knights, even through their obvious pride (for which numerous medieval commentators decried them), would have to have been aware of the danger. My belief is that heavy cavalry—when charging in tight formation over even ground against an equally well disciplined infantry—would have done well. I noticed that in each battle the defending generals were careful to select and if possible prepare ground, using this and (sometimes) archers to break up the enemy charge. The breaking of this charge seems to be a common objective of smaller infantry-based armies, unsexy though it was, it was unarguably effective.

In trying to explain why French commanders in particular were slow to grasp the new military realities, I can only think that they must have had ample demonstrations of cavalry’s continued power to rely on it even after the many battles where a predominantly noble cavalry force was defeated by infantry. Pride was surely a factor, but I tend to believe that there was also a tactical reality that a suitably disciplined charge could break even a tightly packed infantry formation. But in most cases they clever hindrances--at Bannockburn, Kephissos, Courtrai, Morlaix, Stavern, Vottern, Crécy, they faced marshy ground and/or a network of ditches intended to break the charge; in other battles hills, dikes, bridges and archers on the flanks served to channel the charging cavalry into a narrower front to prevent the cavalry’s turning of the infantry.

My conclusions are a bit different than the author’s, although they would require more scholarship to defend. My reading of Mr. DeVries’ narrative leads me to conclude that infantry could certainly be effective against cavalry provided that the cavalry forces were not allowed to flank—and that is the reason for the great care the infantry armies seem to have taken to narrow their front. Secondly, in most cases a combined arms approach seems to have been very effective; Edward III was particularly adept at using all three branches of his forces for a balanced attack—artillery in the form of archers and primitive cannon; a cohesive and well-disciplined infantry; and a cavalry force that kept their horses near to pursue the enemy after they had broken against the infantry.

It may well turn out that Mr. DeVries is correct.  I can thus offer a very strong four star recommendation based on several points; the book is exceptionally well documented, reads well, is cogently argued, and presents hard-to-find information on a number of fascinating early fourteenth century battles. The book’s strength is also its weakness, however, as its conclusions are at odds with what generations of military scholars—analyzing the same material—have believed.

Mr. DeVries is an associate professor teaching military history of technology at Loyola College in Maryland.